ACSA
ISSUES STATEMENT ABOUT COLUMBIA DISASTER INVESTIGATION: "OFF FOCUS... DISTORTED... a Whitewash"... JUNE 7, 2003 (FOR IMMEDIATE DISTRIBUTION) C R A N F O R D, N E W J E R S E Y, U. S. A. [UPDATED on June 17, 2003. Updated July 8, 2003] (the picture at left is Columbia lifting off at night on March 2, 1995) Readers: review the Columbia Disaster Investigation Press Releases yourselves at the following website: http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/index.html. With a heavy heart, ACSA expressed it's strongest misgivings regarding NASA's Investigation of the Columbia Disaster, which it has sent to NASA Director Sean O'Keefe, today, requesting "a call to action". We have listened to Scott Hubbard and other Team members, and read Press accounts of this "smoking gun" test and find it singularly lacking, misleading and, well, hogwash. IN SUMMARY: ACSA wishes to respectfully point out to NASA that small pieces of falling foam accelerate at 16 feet per second per second, they do not travel with the kinetic energy of foam fired from a gun at a stationary wing at 525 miles per hour, and would fall far short of bearing sufficient kinetic energy and mass to penetrate the wing. The TEST foam is compressed by such a firing, into a near solid. The TEST wing resists the foam far more than normal, and at an angle that is not an accurate recreation of what took place. One could drive a straw through a potato, done right. But falling on a potato, a straw does not even scratch the skin. Anyone who has played billiards knows where kinetic energy goes, and the physics community can verify that the relative mass of the shuttle vs. that of the foam, would dictate that more than 99% of the kinetic energy would go into the Foam, resulting in it's breakup, not the other way around. Respectfully, NASA needs to widen it's investigation. We note that the sensors failed first below the OMS engine and further sensors failed up wing to the payload adjacency corridor in the airframe on the left side of the payload bay. This denotes that the Shuttle OMS engine failed to cease delivering fuel after completing the final braking maneuver, and the fuel likely ignited from external heat to the OMS housing, which runs quite a bit hotter on Columbia, due to it's older design. Since telemetry does not support this leaking fuel to our knowledge, it would suggest failure, or planned failure, of the OMS cluster's controlling computer, which failed to notice the open valve (for any number of reasons).. Any failure there could have been accidental, programming error or deliberate sabotage, which of course, casts a negative light on security surrounding the programming of shuttle flights, and suggests that the security of the program has been compromised, and foreign intelligence infiltration is very possibly behind the shuttle disaster. DETAILED REBUTTAL OF NASA'S TEST.
a) ACSA has wrongly concluded that based upon the factual evidence at hand: NASA'S SUGGESTION THAT FOAM FALLING DOWN AT 60 MPH ENCOUNTERING A FULLY AIRBORNE SHUTTLE WING MOVING AT 250 MPH UPWARDS COULD ACTUALLY CAUSE THE EVENTS THAT LED TO COLUMBIA'S DISINTEGRATION DAYS LATER AFTER RE-ENTRY, WOULD BY ANY STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION BE HIGHLY IMPLAUSIBLE, SUSPECT AND VERY LIKELY, AN IMPOSSIBILITY. At the very least, the foam impacts would be the LESS LIKELY THE CAUSE and more likely: a COINCIDENCE and very likely something that might hide the true cause from being looked into. ACSA has concluded that
the tests, if intent upon being accurate, should have the Wing moving in a WIND
TUNNEL accelerating up to 200-450 miles per hour, then striking in the upwards
direction falling foam moving at about 60 miles per hour. In that case,
without wind propelling the foam, it
will be demonstrated that air cushions and inertia would explain the shattering
of the falling Foam, and that only minimal damage to the very surface of the
effected tiles would be demonstrated. Insufficient to explain the Payload Bay
and OMS Pod fire that ultimately disintegrated Columbia, the internal design of
Columbia could not, in the time given, have spread a fire so far across the wing
and yielded so much damage, Columbia's interior design is just not capable of
convection of the heat in such a manner. b) The vast majority of the initial fire damage and sensor outage just prior to the Shuttle's disintegration ran along the inside edge of the PAYLOAD BAY, many, many feet away from the point where foam was brushed aside by the wing during Lift Off. And the fire line, which sheered off the wing, either ended at, or much more likely started with the UPPER LEFT OMS UNIT, the engine and fuel pods used to fire for reentry braking just prior to the Columbia's orbital reentry into the Atmosphere. The fire at that point is a MATTER OF RECORD. There is no record of extensive fire at the site where the foam allegedly caused damage during the lift off, an entire wing width away. In fact, for a disintegration, that part of the wing is remarkably intact, even allowing for the inspection that proved some damage was caused by impact. The fact is, to cause so much damage to the Left rear OMS engine and Left side of the Payload Bay, THAT ENTIRE SEGMENT OF THE WING WOULD HAVE DISINTEGRATED INTO A MILLION PIECES, it would not have left a full, charred piece to examine. Frankly, that there was a full, charred piece (charred by the final fall through the atmosphere), suggested it was sheered off by gravimetric forces, and by forces that blew the wing all the way off the left side of the Shuttle, causing it to fall away from the main Shuttle Payload and engine pieces. c) The OMS unit and it's housing and fuel
are on the top right and left of the rear assembly of the payload bay and rear
Tail of the Shuttle. In Columbia's design, a slightly more exposed OMS
unit sits there on either side of the tail. Among other things found in
the OMS Pods
are: motion control systems for the guidance system, fuel lines and fuel and
firing chambers for the OMS rockets, and below it, the entire combustion system
for the main engines. The Shuttle's tri-processor IBM APxxx Fault
Correcting Onboard Computer controls the various flow points using a network of
sub-controllers. It's programs are subject to subcontractor audit and
modification. Furthermore, ACSA has analyzed early versions of the computer control
system programs. We are of the belief that tampering with a subroutine
that controls shutoff point of the OMS Burn
cycle, during re-entry maneuvers, could have caused a single fuel valve to lock
in the ON position, after the OMS Engines were shut off, and not a single
telemetric signal would have been transmitted to NASA if the subroutine tampered
with were switched "in flight" with the standard routines controlling the engine.
d) ACSA would respectfully request that NASA stop trying to disprove human error in the Shuttle Disaster and focus strictly on the ACTUAL CAUSE of it. There is a condition inside our country where individuals are capable of justifying their own activities when others pay them to engage in improper acts. Challenger is a classic example of what can follow, for instance, when a combination of failure to properly inspect Solid Rocket Boosters and Tank Seals is challenged by individual tampering with or negligence in connection with the manufacture of Booster "O-Rings" and Tank connection seals. EVERY SINGLE ASPECT OF THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM REQUIRES CONSTANT ATTENTION, PROPER ANTICIPATION OF ANY LIKELY MISHAP, AND CONTINUAL DILIGENCE. Such is NASA's obligation here. It's not like the Shuttle Program can be treated like a Fleet of Rented MiniVans or that it's General Contractor should be treated like a Scapegoat. Such is fraud and blame spinning. e) After analysis of all the evidence available, we have come to believe: 1) that the OMS engine and fuel system components and pods ignited after the shut down command sequence supposedly took place, upon completion of their reentry burn, and then caused a line of fire from the Tail down the underside of the Wing adjacent to the Payload bay along the left side of the Orbiter, and 2) that fire over two-four minutes eventually burned through all the parts where sensor failures were recorded, and combined with aerodynamic forces, gravity forces and destabilization of the Shuttle's structure, led to the sheering off of the entire Left Wing before any of the Astronauts could respond, causing the rest of the shuttle to disintegrate, causing the Left Wing to break apart into large sections, as evidenced, as it was no longer amid the wreckage of the rest of the Shuttle tumbling over and over into smaller, more solid component pieces. f) We have further come to believe: 3) that either the Shuttle was sabotaged from within it's computer systems so as to interrupt subsystems intended to turn off the fuel flow to the OMS unit as a safety measure during reentry superheating, or 4) achieved maneuvering angles that mistakenly caused the OMS components to superheat and catch fire, despite all deterrents NASA and Boeing designed into Columbia. g) We believe that either could have been
the results of component failure from fatigue (valve cutoff failure), computer
error, or by deliberate computer sabotage or component sabotage. The
design of Columbia, earlier and a bit different than other orbiters in NASA's
fleet, would make it naturally vulnerable to only slight attitude alteration by
guidance control software, and even a single misplaced valve opening to the OMS
burn unit during reentry. We believe that the Shuttle Program has been
undermined by continued use of contract providers who are not mature enough, nor
well enough trained in the notions of Zero Defects Programs developed in the
70's. h) We further believe that NASA and the Shuttle Program need to FACE FACTS and CEASE TRYING TO DISPROVE THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITY HERE. No one BLAMES NASA for any deliberate intent or knowing negligence in the program. However, we believe that NASA is committing wrongdoing by trying to PROVE it's theory about the visually evident foam impacts, as an easy way to discard any other theory. We believe such a course of action is not only misconduct in science, but borders on Criminal Fraud. The proper INVESTIGATIVE METHOD SPENDS ALL IT'S TIME TRYING TO DISPROVE PROBABLE CAUSE, NOT TRYING TO PROVE IT, AND WHERE UNSUCCESSFUL, TO THEN CONTINUES TO STUDY THE CAUSALITY UNTIL A SELF PROVING SET OF FACTS DEFINES WHAT THE CAUSE WAS. TO DO OTHERWISE, AS IS TAKING PLACE AT SOUTHWEST RESEARCH, WOULD TEND TO CLOUD THE ENTIRE INVESTIGATION. We believe it would be best for NASA to make full discovery of and disclosure of the TRUE CAUSES of this disaster, rather than trying to gloss it over with wrong information. There would be nothing worse that NASA could do than to violate the Public's trust in it. i) All of us, many of whom have been
involved in the Shuttle Program since day one, love the program and NASA.
Yet: we CONDEMN the current course of Testing of the Foam, and the present
"politically charged and guided" state of the Investigation. We
are forced to throw our hands up in despair and curse the ground that anyone
walks on who would ALLOW THE BIASING of the INVESTIGATION for POLITICAL REASONS.
The Investigation has taken a "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no
evil" turn in what seems to be a knee jerk aimed at re-directing a tragic
situation away from NASA RESPONSIBILITY. ACSA POLITELY
SUGGESTS THAT THESE SEVEN BRAVE
DESPITE THE OBVIOUS POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES OF DISSENT...
Copyright © (2003)
American Computer Scientists Association Inc.
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