by John M. Curtis                                           An ACSA Reprint™
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Copyright January 5, 2003
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onsidered a national hero, Pakistan's homegrown nuclear bomb maker Abdul Qadeer Khan may be more dangerous than Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden. Defying the international community, Khan is on the State Department's most wanted list for supplying nuclear technology to terrorists and rogue regimes. "If the international community had a proliferation most wanted list, A.Q. Khan would be most wanted on the list," said Robert J. Einhorn, former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation in the Clinton administration. While Saddam and bin Laden are rumored to be obsessed with atomic bombs, the 66-year-old former metallurgist designed and built Pakistan's nuclear bomb industry, giving the impoverished south Asian nation parity with its archrival, India. Khan has reportedly lent his nuclear expertise to Iraq, Iran and North Korea—President George W. Bush's infamous axis of evil.

      Since Sept. 11, the U.S. ignored Pakistan's status as a rogue nation responsible for nuclear proliferation on the Indian sub-continent. Long before Musharraf ousted former prime minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup in 1999, Khan was busy developing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal under Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's only female prime minister, now in exile. While Pakistan's nuclear ambitions began before Bhutto, she concurred with Khan's view that Pakistan was vulnerable to Indian aggression without nuclear weapons. When Truman dropped A-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, few imagined that deterrence—AKA Mutual Assured Destruction—would become the primary vehicle holding the peace. " . . . I built a weapon of peace, which seems hard to understand until you realize Pakistan's nuclear capability is a deterrence to aggression . . ." Khan told a Pakastani journalist in 2001, arguing that A-bombs keep the peace.

      Though not regarded as an Islamic radical, Khan built nuclear bombs for fame and fortune, reportedly constructing several lavish estates. When India tested its first nuclear device in 1974, Khan was working in the Netherlands for a uranium enrichment company named Urenco. Khan stole the plans for Urenco's gas centrifuges and set up Pakistan's fissile program roughly a year after leaving Urenco. "He stole the blueprints," said David Kay, chief weapons evaluator for the International Atomic Energy Agency, confirming that Khan created Pakistan's first uranium enrichment facility known as A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories near Islamabad. Khan built several A-bombs by 1986, using what many think were Chinese plans. It's Khan's proficiency at building uranium enrichment equipment that troubles nonproliferation experts, now concerned that Pakistan—or some third party—might broker fissile material to terrorists or rogue states.

      When North Korea announced in Oct. 2002 that it would resume its Yongbyon uranium enrichment plant, the dots weren't yet connected to Islamabad. U.S. officials now acknowledge that Khan began discussions with Pyongyang in 1993 to obtain 10-12 long-range Nodong ballistic missiles. It's now known that Pakistan's former prime minister Benazir Bhutto secretly traveled to North Korea to consummate the deal in 1993. U.S. officials now believe that in exchange for Nodong ballistic missles, Khan gave North Korea the blueprints for enriching uranium, prompting the Clinton administration in 1994 to pressure Pyongyang to abandon its program in exchange for humanitarian aid and fuel oil. Also troubling is Pakistan's direct involvement Iran's illicit nuclear program, signing a cooperation agreement in 1986. Western intelligence reports that Khan visited Iran's Bushiehr nuclear power plant on several occasions in the late '80s.

      Western intelligence also confirms Pakistan helped Iran build two nuclear plants, Arak and Natanz, that exiles contend generate fissile material. Both facilities have Khan's fingerprints on its gas centrifuges. In October 2000, only three months before the Gulf War, an intermediary for Khan reportedly met Iraqi intelligence agents. An Oct. 6, 2000 memo found by U.N. Weapon's inspectors in 1995 included "a proposal from Pakistani nuclear scientist Abd-el Qadeer Khan" to help Iraq "establish a project to enrich uranium and manufacture nuclear weapons." The memo indicated that Khan "was prepared to give us project designs for nuclear weapons," and the go-between based in Greece would supply all materials from Western Europe. Pakistan claims the memo found by U.N. weapons inspectors was bogus. "The memo was taken quite seriously," said David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector.

      Under growing pressure, self-appointed President Pervez Musharraf retired Khan as head of Pakistan's nuclear programs, appointing him presidential advisor. Even Secretary of State Colin L. Powell raised concerns with Musharraf that Khan lent his nuclear expertise to North Korea. "Musharraf assured me, as he has previously, that Pakistan is not doing anything of that nature," though not ruling out Khan's work as an entrepreneur. With the U.S. ready to attack Iraq over "weapons of mass destruction," it's imperative that Pakistan—or its nuclear scientists—doesn't spread nuclear technology to terrorists and rogue nations. Collaborating on terrorism in the short term won't help the dangerous threat posed by the proliferation of atomic know-how or weapons. Bomb makers and mercenaries, like Abdul Qadeer Khan, represent every bit the threat as madmen like Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.

About the Author

John M. Curtis is editor of OnlineColumnist.com. He writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

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